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Avg. Customer Rating: 4.0 / 5.0

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Epstein and O'Halloran's work is a refreshing analysis of delegation under the separation of powers. Their formal analysis captures many aspects of recent research and combines them into a simple yet concrete theory. They have an extensive yet concise literature review and develop an empirical model that well demonstrates their theory. The only deficiency, and a small on at that, is their lack of analysis regarding the crafting of legislation and the politics involved. They note a decrease in delegation... more info

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